All existing models of crisis bargaining lead to the same conclusion under asymmetric information: strong actors must convince the opponent that they are not bluffing. The usual solution is credible information revelation through some sort of costly signaling. However, these models ignore the problem that when war begins, strong actors may actually benefit from their opponent thinking they are weak. This creates contradictory incentives during the pre-war crisis: actors want to persuade the opponent of their strength to gain a better deal but, should war break out, they would rather have the opponent believe they are weak. I present an ultimatum crisis bargaining model that incorporates this feature and show that in equilibrium the strong actor will pretend to be weak during the bargaining phase with positive probability. The substantive implications are serious. If an actor fails to send a credible signal, then the traditional logic would lead one to infer that this actor is weak. If this results in a more intransigent bargaining stance, the crisis will be more likely to end in war. If the opponent has feigned weakness, the one will be at a serious disadvantage in this war.