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Erica Frantz

by Kristin Chernoff last modified 2007-09-11 14:44

Field:
    Comparative Politics and International Relations (Minor in Quantitative Methods)

Dissertation Title:
    Tying the Dictator’s Hands: Elite Coalitions in Authoritarian Regimes

Committee:
    Barbara Geddes, Chair, James DeNardo, George Tsebelis, and William Summerhill, History

Date of Completion:
    June 2008 (expected)

Contact Information:
    Erica Frantz
    UCLA Political Science Department
    4289 Bunche Hall
    Los Angeles, California 90095-1472
    Phone: 310-825-4331
    Fax: 310-825-0778

Curriculum Vitae:
    Download PDF Version

Dissertation Summary:
    This dissertation develops an innovative theoretical argument which highlights the impact of institutions on the constraints that dictators face on their behavior. I examine the conditions that cause authoritarian leaders to wage war, to enact significant policy changes, and to step down from power. Given that most dictators are ousted by members of their own inner circle, my argument emphasizes the role of the dictator’s support group: the elite coalition. Whether elites are bound together by a dominant institution, like a military or party, has profound consequences for dictators’ bargaining power over policy relative to their supporters. My research offers important contributions to both the comparative politics and international relations literatures. Theoretically, I identify the mechanism by which the presence of strong institutions influences the capacity of elites to check the dictator’s power. On the empirical front, I show not only that institutions under dictatorship matter, but also how they matter. The dissertation helps to explain multiple political outcomes, ranging from the ability of dictatorships to send signals of commitment during inter-state disputes to their capacity to attract foreign direct investment. Assuming that dictatorships are all one and the same conceals important differences in the institutional structure of these regimes, and consequently, in the ability of dictators’ supporting coalitions to tie the hands of the dictator.

Research Interests:
    Authoritarian Institutions, International/Comparative Political Economy, Quantitative Methods

Teaching Interests:
    Introduction to Data Analysis, Game Theory, or Comparative Politics; Comparative / International Political Economy; Domestic Institutions and Foreign Policy; Comparative Institutional Analysis; the Political Economy of Dictatorships.

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4289 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472 Phone 310.825.4331 Fax 310.825.0778