Field:
    Comparative Politics - China

Dissertation Title:
    Rural Tax Reform and Authoritarian Rule in China

Committee:
    Richard Baum (Chair), Kathleen Bawn, Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal (Economics, Cal Tech), C. Cindy Fan (Geography)

Date of Completion:
    September 2006

Contact Information:
    Hiroki Takeuchi
    Stanford University
    Public Policy Program
    Encina Hall West, Room 204
    Stanford, CA 94305-6050
    Phone: 650-725-0109 (office)
    650-917-9675 (home)
    310-254-0609 (cell)
    Fax: 650-723-6108

Curriculum Vitae:
    Download PDF Version

Dissertation Summary:
    My dissertation advances the study of the political economy of reform in China by examining the unintended effects of massive rural migration. I explain why migration results in the deterioration of local government performance and the lack of public goods provision to agricultural areas. I use game theory to explain the logic of this argument. Once migration from rural to urban areas is allowed under the authoritarian regime, the state fails to collect taxes from agricultural areas, which results in the failure of the provision of public goods to poor areas. In other words, migration negatively affects local government performance unless residents have an effective way of participating in the decision-making processes of their local governments. Village elections and petitions—institutions for political participation in China’s rural areas—are not effective means to reflect popular preferences on the decision-making process. The model’s prediction conforms to what happened in China’s rural areas since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping started the market-oriented reform, where the rich became richer, while the poor became poorer. The argument is based on my findings from my extensive field research, interviewing more than a hundred people in 40 villages across the provinces of Guangdong, Guizhou, Hebei, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang, which include both the more industrialized coastal provinces and the less developed inland provinces.

Research Interests:
    My research interests center on Chinese politics, political economy, and comparative politics. I am particularly interested in taxation, participation, and migration in rural China, and how they are related to the regime type—China’s authoritarian regime. My broader research interests extend to the comparison of rural governance between China and Japan, roles and functions of local governments and their implications on state-society relations, the domestic politics of Sino-Japanese relations, the politics of China’s accession to the WTO, China’s regional protectionism and its implications to the geographic pattern of industrial structure, and Taiwan’s democratization and the implications of this on relations between China and Taiwan. I use game theory in my research because it can help explain phenomena or outcomes that would otherwise be puzzling by clarifying choices and behaviors of the stakeholders in the political bargaining, which formal institutions do not necessarily govern under China’s authoritarian regime.

Teaching Interests:
    I have a very broad ability to teach introductory courses on Chinese politics, Japanese politics, political economy, comparative politics, international political economy, and international relations. I can also teach more advanced courses on post-Mao Chinese political economy, Chinese foreign policy, the international relations of East Asia, the comparative development of politics and economics, and game theory in political science (both introductory and advanced). I have taught the upper-division undergraduate courses on the politics of Chinese revolutions, international political economy, and the international relations of East Asia at UCLA as faculty fellow.