Joseph Wright
Field:
Comparative and International Political Economy and Methodology
Dissertation Title:
Political Regimes and Foreign Aid: How Aid Affects Growth and Democratization
Committee:
Barbara Geddes (chair), Ronald Rogowski, Jeffrey Lewis, Aaron Tornell (Economics)
Date of Completion:
June 2007
Contact Information:
Joseph Wright
UCLA Political Science Department
4289 Bunche Hall
Los Angeles, California 90095-1472
Phone: 310-825-4331
Fax: 310-825-0778
Curriculum Vitae:
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Dissertation Summary:
This dissertation explains how foreign aid affects economic growth in recipient country dictatorships and
democracies, and then examines whether foreign aid helps or hinders democratization. The first three chapters
investigate how domestic political constraints in both dictatorships and democracies provide aid recipients with
incentives over how they use aid. Here I explain how legislatures and time horizons in authoritarian regimes, and
political institutions such as the level of personalism and the type of executive in democracies, affect the
relationship between foreign aid and economic growth. From a policy perspective, understanding the effect of these
political constraints is the missing piece to the aid-growth puzzle. In the final chapter, I argue that foreign aid
to dictators with large support coalitions induces democratization because these dictators are more likely to remain
in power should they hold free elections. In contrast, foreign aid to dictators with small coalitions entrenches
authoritarian rule.
Research Interests:
Comparative Political Economy, International Political Economy, Globalization and Political/Economic Development,
Quantitative Methods
Teaching Interests:
Comparative Politics (Intro, CPE, Latin American Politics, Political Economy of Development,
Democratization/Political Development); International Relations (Intro, IPE, International Development); Research
Design and Methods (Undergraduate and Graduate)