Field:
International Relations, Formal Theory and Quantitative Methods

Dissertation Title:
Mediation in the Shadow of Coercion: The Strategy of Great Power Intervention in International Conflicts

Committee:
Kenneth Schultz, Stanford University (Dissertation Chair)
Barry O’Neill, UCLA
Marc Trachtenberg, UCLA, and
Kristian Gleditsch, University of Essex

Date of Completion:
June 2008

Contact Information:
Katja Favretto
UCLA Political Science Department
4289 Bunche Hall
Los Angeles, California 90095-1472
Phone: 310-825-4331
Fax: 310-825-0778

Curriculum Vitae:
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Dissertation Summary:
What motivates major powers to intervene in conflicts? Why do some use military coercion in negotiating settlements, while others choose to mediate by helping the disputed sides communicate effectively? When can powerful countries succeed in efforts to end war? This dissertation uses game theory, quantitative analyses and case studies to show how bias--a close alignment of preferences between a major power and one of the parties involved in an international dispute--affects the manner and the outcome of intervention bargaining. I find that biased major powers make effective third parties because they have a highly credible threat to use force against the less favored belligerent. Such biased interveners nonetheless prefer to coerce under the guise of mediation because, in doing so, they can extract concessions in a less costly, private setting. These intervention efforts are more likely to succeed precisely because disputants expect coercion in the event that settlement talks fail.

Research Interests:
International conflict management, crisis bargaining, third-party intervention in international disputes

Teaching Interests:
Third parties in international conflicts, U.S. foreign policy, strategic interaction, international relations theory, ethnic conflict, mathematics for political science, game theory, and quantitative methods