“CHIPPING AWAY AT THE ISSUES”:

DOES A PIECEMEAL APPROACH TO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT WORK?

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ABSTRACT

Disputants often have the option to resolve their disagreements in a series of partial settlements, addressing a subset of the issues at a time. How viable is such a piecemeal strategy? I argue that partial settlements can decrease tensions, build trust, generate demands for additional cooperation, and provide guidance for future negotiations. As a result, partial settlements should reduce conflict and facilitate the resolution of remaining disagreements. Yet, some scholars have raised doubts about the efficacy of partial settlements and a systematic empirical test is necessary to determine whether a piecemeal approach works. Using data from worldwide interstate territorial claims between 1919-2001, I find that partial settlements do not initially have a conflict-dampening effect, but that they promote the resolution of remaining contentious issues and thus help reduce conflict in the longer run. While not a panacea, partial settlements can be a valuable conflict management tool.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In all but the simplest disputes parties might choose to pursue a piecemeal approach whereby they address individual aspects of the dispute in successive partial agreements. A prominent example of such a piecemeal approach is the territorial dispute settlement process between Argentina and Chile. For much of the 20th century the relationship between the two countries was plagued by competing territorial claims to the Palena region, Laguna Del Desierto, and several islands in the Beagle Channel. These sometimes contentious claims were resolved over years in a series of steps in which the parties agreed on how sovereignty should be assigned in individual disputed areas before they moved towards finding solutions for other aspects of their territorial dispute. This settlement strategy gradually chipped away at Argentina and Chile’s territorial disagreements, decreased military tensions between them, and culminated in the resolution of their last remaining border dispute in 1998.

The goal of this paper is to examine how representative the case of Argentina and Chile is of the effectiveness of a piecemeal approach to dispute resolution. Can partial settlements put disputants on a peaceful path and help them arrive at a full resolution of their disagreements? I argue that proceeding in a gradual fashion eases tensions between the parties, allows them to build trust and good will, generates incentives for greater cooperation, and provides helpful insights into how to ensure the success of future negotiations. As a result, partial settlements should reduce the likelihood of open military conflict between the adversaries and should ultimately bring about the settlement of remaining disagreements.

While there are good reasons to expect a piecemeal approach to be an effective conflict resolution strategy, many scholars raise doubts as to whether it is worthwhile or even advisable to pursue partial settlements. The concerns regarding partial settlements are quite varied. One
argument against partial settlements is that they tend to address only minor issues and thus are unlikely to improve the relationship between the adversaries in any meaningful way. A second set of criticisms suggests that partial settlements may actually be detrimental. Rather than ameliorating conflict and paving the way for a complete resolution of the dispute, partial settlements might increase the risk of conflict and undermine further settlement efforts.

In light of competing arguments about the efficacy of a piecemeal approach to dispute resolution, a systematic empirical test of the promises and pitfalls of this strategy is called for. An excellent arena in which to assess piecemeal dispute resolution is competing territorial claims. Disputes over territory have been shown to be particularly conflict-prone and can thus be seen as hard cases for conflict resolution. To the extent that a piecemeal strategy works in the context of territorial disputes, it may be viable in disputes over other types of issues as well.

This paper relies on newly compiled data on partial settlements of worldwide territorial claims between 1919 and 2001. Partial settlements are peaceful and mutual attempts to substantively resolve a subset of the issues under contention while leaving other elements of the dispute for future consideration. In the empirical test, I examine whether partial settlements can reduce military hostilities and lead to the full settlement of the entire territorial dispute. I find that partial settlements, at least initial ones, do not have an immediate conflict-reducing effect, but, after a dyad has concluded multiple partial settlements, there may be a decreased likelihood of hostilities. Furthermore, partial settlements help foster peaceful relations in the long run by facilitating the resolution of remaining disputed issues. Once states have concluded a partial settlement, they are significantly more likely to arrive at a full settlement of the entire territorial claim.
This paper makes two sets of contributions. First, it advances the scholarly research program on conflict resolution by shifting attention from actors and venues of conflict management to questions of the agenda and content of settlement attempts. Numerous studies focus on third-party conflict management and this is certainly a crucial factor in dispute resolution. However, it is also important to examine if other aspects of the settlement process bear on whether a solution is found. Consideration of the content and design of individual settlements is particularly promising, because this is something the adversaries can determine themselves, even in the absence of third-party help.

Second, the question of whether a step-wise dispute settlement procedure is a viable approach to conflict resolution is important for policy-makers. Politicians, pundits, and scholars have often debated whether a piecemeal approach may be a worthwhile strategy when no comprehensive settlement seems immediately feasible. Opinions have diverged significantly and have often been based on generalizations from individual high profile cases. Given persistent uncertainty about what to expect from a piecemeal approach, it is useful to investigate the consequences of partial settlements in a more systematic fashion. This paper formulates clear theoretical expectations and provides systematic empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of partial settlements in the context of territorial claims. It thus provides the starting point of what can be a very useful line of inquiry for policy-makers involved in conflict resolution.

II. RESOLVING TERRITORIAL CONFLICT

Many of the ongoing international disputes with the greatest potential for escalation involve territorial issues, such as the South China Sea, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Kashmir, Sudan and South Sudan’s claims to Abyei and Heglig, and Russia’s European borders. The
dangers to international peace posed by territorial conflicts are well established in the IR literature. Scholars have shown that states with competing territorial claims are more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), see these disputes escalate to war, and develop rivalries (e.g. Hensel 2000; Kocs 1995; Leskiw and Vasquez 2001; Vasquez 1993). Even without active military conflict, territorial disputes take a toll on the involved states by depressing economic exchange and other mutually beneficial cooperation (Simmons 2005). For instance, the rise in tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands led to a significant decrease in the volume of trade between China and Japan and foreign investment also plummeted.\footnote{See, for example, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-08/china-japan-dispute-takes-rising-toll-of-asia-s-top-economies.html} Given the detrimental effects of persistent territorial conflict, it is useful to examine how and when these disputes can be settled.

There have been numerous studies investigating factors that facilitate or inhibit the peaceful management of territorial claims, including studies emphasizing issue salience (e.g. Hensel 2001), history of conflict (e.g. Hensel 2001; Hensel, Mitchell, Sowers, and Thyne 2008), regime type (e.g. Huth and Allee 2002), and the domestic and international legal environment (e.g. Huth, Croco, and Appel 2011; Powell and Wiegand 2010). Examining the effect of these factors certainly enhances our ability to predict when territorial claims may be resolved peacefully and when not. However, this research unfortunately does not readily lend itself to practical policy advice, given that these are largely contextual factors that are outside the control of policy-makers.

Fortunately, another branch of the literature has engaged aspects of the conflict resolution process that can be manipulated by political actors. A particular focus has been on third parties...
and their role in facilitating peaceful deals through either non-binding (i.e. mediation, conciliation, good offices) or binding (i.e. arbitration, adjudication) techniques. Binding third-party conflict management has been shown to be especially successful at bringing about a lasting settlement (Allee and Huth 2006; Gent and Shannon 2010; Mitchell and Hensel 2007; Simmons 2002). Yet, as promising as it is, binding third-party conflict management is also quite rare. Only about four percent of territorial claim settlement attempts are the product of binding efforts, 24% result from non-binding techniques, and more than 70% are bilateral.\(^2\) Given the frequency of bilateral efforts, it seems particularly important to examine how the claimants themselves can shape the resolution process so as to reduce hostility and bring about a durable settlement.

Sebenius (1983: 281) points out that both “issues and parties […] are often important choice variables in negotiation.” So far, conflict scholars have given much more systematic attention to the ‘who’ of the settlement process than to the ‘what’, but it is important to recognize that there is also substantial variation in the types of settlement agreements parties pursue. One option the parties may choose is to fractionate their various disagreements and deal with them in successive partial settlements. In territorial disputes, parties might start by assigning sovereignty over individual disputed areas, while leaving other claims initially unresolved, and then later move on towards settling additional territories. Such sequential partial settlements occur in territorial claims with some frequency. Among the 240 worldwide dyadic territorial claims between 1919 and 2001 considered here, in 60 (25%), the parties opted for a piecemeal approach. In 86 claims, the parties chose an immediate comprehensive settlement, while no peaceful settlement was concluded in 94 cases.

\(^2\) These frequencies are based on the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Attempted Settlement Data (Hensel and Mitchell 2007).
While the possibility of a piecemeal approach is touched upon in a number of conflict resolution studies, references to the benefits and risks of this approach are mostly in passing and the focus typically lies elsewhere (Fisher 1964; Fisher and Ury 2011; Kratochwil, Rohrlich, and Mahajan 1985; Miall 1992; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006). The literature on issue linkage and gradualism in international cooperation provides a more focused discussion of the pros and cons of limited agreements (e.g. Abbott and Snidal 2002; Langlois and Langlois 2001; Sebenius 1983; Weiss 2003). However, these studies are often oriented toward international cooperation broadly and do not necessarily address incremental cooperation in the context of entrenched conflict. They also tend to emphasize theory development and do not typically test their propositions empirically. To my knowledge, there is no work that provides an in-depth theoretical treatment and an empirical test of the effectiveness of a piecemeal approach to conflict resolution. Yet, the question of whether proceeding in a piecemeal fashion can be successful is clearly important in light of persistent territorial and other interstate disputes.

III. THE PROMISE OF A PIECEMEAL APPROACH

In order to gauge the effectiveness of a piecemeal dispute resolution strategy, it is important to first determine the criteria by which the success or failure of such a strategy should be judged. One option is to use a more minimalist approach and examine whether individual partial settlements can accomplish their immediate goal of resolving the particular issues that they are intended to address. To the extent that they do, partial settlements can generate significant, if local or regional, benefits. Once the question of sovereignty for a particular piece of territory is settled, the chance of conflict over this territory diminishes and property rights can be firmly established. This not only fosters order and predictability in daily life, but also
encourages increased economic exchange. Indeed, a review of partial territorial settlements between 1919-2001 shows that for 77% of these settlements there is no indication that they were rejected, either in whole or in part, at any point in time.\(^3\) This suggests that the far majority of partial settlements are successful at accomplishing the more limited goal of resolving the subset of disputed issues that they deal with.

While it is encouraging that partial settlements often have beneficial immediate effects, the question is whether they can contribute to an improvement of the parties’ relationship more broadly. As Brewster (2010) argues, incremental policy interventions need to be evaluated not simply based on their direct results, but also their dynamic implications for future decisions and outcomes. In the context of territorial conflict resolution, two outcomes are of particular interest: can partial settlements reduce the likelihood of military hostilities between the parties and can they bring about a final resolution of the remaining claims? If partial settlements accomplish both of these goals, then a piecemeal approach would appear particularly promising, but success on either front would be valuable. If partial settlements reduce conflict yet fail to bring about a final resolution, this still limits the costliness of the territorial claim. If partial settlements fail to prevent hostilities in the short run but ultimately contribute to a final settlement of all claims, they also should be considered an effective tool of conflict resolution. Once states accomplish the resolution of all their territorial disagreements, they are significantly less likely to experience militarized disputes (Owsia 2012; Schultz 2014) and they often reap substantial benefits from enhanced trade relations (Simmons 2002).

\(^3\) 77% of partial settlements examined here were ratified and implemented and did not fail as a result of renunciation, violence, or reemergence of the claim at a later point in time.
There are good reasons to believe that the benefits of partial settlements should go beyond their immediate effect of resolving individual issues to also fostering a peaceful relationship between the parties and bringing about the resolution of remaining disagreements. Regarding the first outcome of interest, partial settlements should make conflict less likely simply because they chip away at potential points of contention that may spark hostilities. All else equal, the fewer aspects of the territorial claim remain disputed, the fewer the issues the parties might fight over. Furthermore, and at a more fundamental level, the conclusion of partial settlements helps create a détente between the adversaries.

The pernicious consequences of international anarchy tend to be more pronounced in situations in which states are contending over tangible resources. In particular, states with competing territorial claims often have a tense and hostile relationship, as evidenced, for instance, in the territorial disputes involving Israel and its Arab neighbors. In such a situation, a security dilemma may unfold: behavior by the other side can easily be interpreted as a threat and interactions may escalate into open conflict. Hostilities are thus possible even if the parties do not necessarily harbor aggressive intentions. Some scholars have suggested that when the antagonism between the parties is profound, a gradual conflict resolution process may be beneficial (Kratochwil et al 1985; Weiss 2003). In his 2007 book, Kydd formalizes this intuition to show that partial cooperative gestures can function as costly signals of a side’s trustworthiness and allow actors to build trust where none previously existed. The key is that the gestures be costly enough that a state with expansionary intentions and no real interest in rapprochement would not undertake them, but not so costly as to deter a state that wants to improve the relationship with the adversary from undertaking them. In his case chapters, Kydd provides several examples of effective cooperative gestures. Many are unilateral actions such as troop
withdrawals and domestic reforms, but he also discusses some bi- and multilateral efforts, specifically arms limitation agreements.

On the surface, partial territorial settlements appear to be distinct from the gestures that Kydd focuses on in that they are explicitly bilateral and present substantive resolutions to underlying disputes rather than mere efforts to limit the potential for confrontation. They are conflict resolution rather than conflict management efforts. Nevertheless, partial territorial settlements fit Kydd’s parameters for effective costly signals well: surrendering control over a piece of territory or recognizing the adversary’s sovereignty over a disputed area undoubtedly entails costs (e.g. loss of resources, domestic punishment of the leader); at the same time, because the parties determine the scope of the issues to be settled, they can opt for limited settlements that ensure that the costs and risks to the parties are not too high to be prohibitive. Thus, following Kydd’s argument, partial territorial agreements can be a promising way to generate good will between disputants and help them transform their relationship. Once trust and good will is built through the conclusion of a partial settlement, it becomes less likely that misperceptions and accidents lead to serious military clashes. As Kydd (2007, 3) points out, “trust and mistrust can make the difference between peace and war.”

An example of the beneficial effects of partial settlements for trust-building is the relationship between Israel and Jordan: while the two were unable to resolve all disagreements between them, including the permanent status of Jerusalem, their 1994 peace treaty effectively settled their border and introduced a phase of unseen tranquility in their relations. We should expect partial territorial settlements to have a negative effect on the potential for military conflict more generally:

_H1: Partial settlements reduce the likelihood of conflict in the dyad._
Moreover, according to Kydd’s model, partial cooperative gestures should not only reduce the potential for military conflict, but also lay the foundation for additional cooperation. “Dividing the game into two rounds so that the parties can reassure each other enables cooperation to take place that otherwise would not have happened (Kydd 2007, 195).” This logic should also apply to partial territorial settlements, which help the parties resolve their territorial conflict in steps when an immediate comprehensive resolution may not be feasible. The conclusion of an initial partial agreement builds good will between the opponents and generates the basis for additional, increasingly more ambitious negotiations on remaining disputed issues. Through a gradual process the parties can then ultimately arrive at a full resolution of their territorial disagreements.

Partial settlements can also foster further attempts at cooperation and conflict resolution through several mechanisms that are not part of Kydd’s model. First, Kydd conceptualizes partial cooperative gestures solely as signals of an underlying political will to cooperate with the adversary, but some types of gestures might create, and not merely reflect, a desire to cooperate. This should be particularly the case for cooperative gestures that aren’t simply costly or risky, and thus make for informative signals, but that also generate clear benefits for the parties. If partial gestures lead to material gain for one or both sides and the countries stand to benefit from further agreements, this can generate new demands for deeper cooperation. In the case of partial territorial settlements, because they showcase the tangible benefits that result from the resolution of the sovereignty question in individual areas, they can spawn calls for tackling additional aspects of the dispute. Domestic actors who benefited from limited cooperation with the adversary and expect to gain from further improvement of the countries’ relationship should be especially likely to advocate additional agreements (Blum 2007).
Second, in Kydd’s model, partial cooperative gestures are informative mainly because they allow the parties to learn about each other’s trustworthiness. Yet, initial attempts at cooperation also provide the parties with the opportunity to garner important practical information and experience that can be useful for tackling remaining disagreements. This should be especially the case for cooperative gestures that are not simple unilateral acts but instead involve interaction by the parties. As scholars of gradualism highlight, one of the big advantages of proceeding in an incremental fashion is that it allows actors to learn about the issue and about how to design future cooperation more effectively (e.g. Abbott and Snidal 2002). In the case of territorial conflict, given that the dynamics underlying distinct pieces of territory may differ, the extent to which insights from a partial settlement can be applied to reaching additional agreements may be more limited than in other areas of cooperation. Yet, previous efforts at partial settlements can still reveal valuable information about what the other side’s preferences are, which legal principles the claimants might agree on, and which negotiation strategies are most effective. Previous efforts to reach a partial settlement can also create a rapport between the negotiators that allows them to gauge their counterparts better in future talks and that forms the basis for more amicable bargaining. Finally, insights from how an earlier partial settlement was received by domestic actors during the ratification process and insights from the implementation stage can inform future negotiations and the design of additional settlements.

Third, Kydd’s unitary actor approach suggests that he sees the effect of reassuring gestures manifest themselves mainly at the level of the countries’ leadership, which becomes more willing to collaborate with the opponent, but we might also expect important effects at the level of domestic audiences. Domestic actors who were previously doubtful of the credibility of their long-term adversary should now be more willing to allow their leaders to pursue deeper
cooperation with the opponent. In this way, partial settlements help remove important domestic obstacles to further cooperation and conflict resolution and allow leaders to yield to demands for additional cooperation.

By building trust between the parties, showcasing the benefits of dispute resolution, providing practical information that facilitates future negotiation efforts, and removing some of the domestic barriers to cooperation with the adversary, partial settlements can create momentum towards the resolution of the entire territorial dispute. Such momentum was generated, for instance, as a result of the initially quite limited interim agreements between long-term adversaries Israel and Egypt. In former Israeli Prime Minister Rabin’s (1979: 275) own words, “the subsequent moves towards achieving a peace treaty […] could never have come about were it not for the course my government adopted in signing the 1975 interim agreement” and “the 1975 agreement with Egypt […] was designed to advance the ‘momentum’ toward peace, and in that sense it has achieved its objective—no minor accomplishment in Middle Eastern Politics.” A second hypothesis about the effect of partial settlements follows:

\[ H_2: \text{Partial settlements increase the likelihood of a full settlement of all remaining territorial claims.} \]

IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS: THE FALSE PROMISE OF A PIECEMEAL APPROACH

While there are compelling arguments for why a piecemeal approach should be an effective conflict resolution strategy, it is important to acknowledge that this is by no means the consensus view in the literature. Looking at entrenched territorial conflicts, Bose (2007: 202), for example, warns that “the incremental approach to making peace has its limitations, even perils.” Bose is not alone in his skepticism. A number of scholars raise quite varied concerns about
gradual dispute resolution—though in most cases these criticisms are presented as side points while the authors focus on different research questions. Still, it is possible to distill two distinct types of criticisms of stepwise approaches.

The first set of criticisms builds on the idea that partial settlements may simply be concluded for symbolic reasons (Iklé 1964). Here the argument is that partial settlements address minor disputes between the parties, while sweeping more contentious issues “under the carpet”. If partial territorial settlements resolve only minor points of contention and leave the salient issues that drive conflict unresolved, we should not expect them to have any effect on the likelihood of militarized disputes between the parties. Furthermore, if partial settlements focus on the ‘easy’ part of a territorial claim it is not clear that they can generate enough trust and good will to lead to the resolution of more complex elements of the underlying dispute. According to Morgan (1990: 318), “it is unlikely that settling minor issues will greatly reduce the impression of a large-scale conflict or make the parties more willing to make concessions on remaining issues just to preserve agreements already reached.” Thus, this line of argument implies that partial settlements should neither reduce the likelihood of conflict between the parties nor put them on a path to comprehensive dispute resolution.

Other scholars go further and propose reasons for why a stepwise approach may actually be harmful. Two sets of arguments suggest that partial settlements might make conflict more rather than less likely. First, partial settlements allow parties that are not sincerely committed to ending a conflict the opportunity to manipulate the situation (Weiss 2003). Partial settlements might be concluded in bad faith to placate the other side while preparations for a new military confrontation are under way. Second, even if concluded in good faith, partial settlements might lead to conflict as a result of what Blum (2007: 47) calls a ‘pressed balloon effect’. The
resolution of individual aspects of the dispute may free up soldiers, equipment, and attention that can be directed to other disputed areas, leading to increased tensions and a greater potential for a military confrontation on high-stakes unresolved issues.

Scholars have not only proposed that partial settlements might lead to an increased risk of militarized disputes, but also that they undermine the final resolution of the claim. First, reaching a limited deal might make the ‘hurting stalemate’ go away and thus remove pressures for a more comprehensive agreement (Blum 2007; Telhami 1990). Second, because a piecemeal approach unfolds over time, spoilers have ample opportunity to mobilize and undermine further steps in the settlement process (Weiss 2003; Abbott and Snidal 2002; Bose 2007). Third, if parties decide to move ahead on some disputed issues but leave other, more delicate aspects of the dispute for future consideration this might entrench the narrative that some issues are intractable. As a result, the parties may refrain from any serious attempt to negotiate for fear that failure is all but guaranteed (Blum 2007; Weiss 2003).

In summary, there are compelling theoretical reasons for why a piecemeal approach should be a promising conflict resolution strategy. At the same time, a review of the literature suggests serious doubts about whether partial settlements are a good idea. Anecdotal evidence can be marshaled to support either a more optimistic or a more pessimistic view of gradual conflict resolution. In order to resolve lingering questions about the efficacy of partial settlements a systematic empirical test is called for.

V. RESEARCH DESIGN

These arguments parallel concerns that mediators’ short-term pressures for an agreement undermine the long-term prospects for peace (e.g. Beardsley 2011).
To examine the effectiveness of piecemeal dispute resolution, I build on data on territorial claims by Huth and Allee (2002) and Huth et al. (2011). I modify their data in two ways. First, I combine multiple claims over different territories disputed between the same pair of states into one overarching dyadic territorial claims case whenever the claims either overlapped in time and thus could have been dealt with together or concerned the same piece of territory at different points in time and the reemergence of the claim thus speaks to the effectiveness of the initial settlement attempt. Second, I split colonial claims cases with multiple parties on one or both sides into distinct dyadic claims. These two modifications produce 240 worldwide dyadic territorial claims and 5,553 (without missing data) dyadic-territorial-claim-years between 1919 and 2001.

**Key Independent Variable: Partial Territorial Settlements**

For each claim case, I collected information on the occurrence, date, and scope of territorial settlements using a variety of sources, including reference compendia (e.g. Biger 1995; Calvert 2004), region-specific sources (e.g. Brownlie 1979), and existing data sets (e.g. Hensel and Mitchell 2007; Huth and Allee 2002; Huth and Prorok Forthcoming). Conceptually, to

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5 For claims between colonial powers, I only aggregate claims on the same continent since different colonial territories may have had separate administrations that did not have the option to link negotiations.

6 Guatemala-Britain/Belize, for example, is disaggregated into a claim between Guatemala and Britain until Belizean independence and a claim between Guatemala and Belize thereafter.

7 While existing data sets sometimes provided valuable information on individual cases, their conceptualization of partial settlements was not in line with the one embraced here. As a result, I had to collect data independently. To identify relevant settlements, I relied on descriptions of the
qualify as a settlement, the parties had to have intended a substantive resolution of the claim by assigning sovereignty over the disputed territory.\textsuperscript{8} Since my goal is to evaluate a peaceful dispute resolution strategy that should be generally available, I also exclude any settlements that were the result of the threat or use of force or unilateral renunciation.\textsuperscript{9} Operationally, territorial settlements thus take the form of agreements between states, arbitration/adjudication awards, or, much more rarely, plebiscites.

Whenever settlements assign sovereignty only to a subset of disputed territories, but leave other elements of the claim unresolved, I code them as partial settlements. An example is the case of Argentina and Uruguay, who, in 1961, decided to first determine ownership over the islands in the Uruguay River and then settled the remaining disagreement over their river

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\textsuperscript{8} I do not consider procedural, functional, or simple conflict management agreements. Future research should illuminate how their effects compare to those of partial settlements.

\textsuperscript{9} I only exclude settlements where the agreement terms were imposed on a party against its will as a direct result of the threat or use of force (e.g. Soviet Union-Romania 1940). Settlements that the parties reached voluntarily—possibly with the help of mediation or arbitration by third parties—after they experienced the costs of a military confrontation are included (e.g. Ecuador-Peru 1998).
boundary in a 1973 treaty (IBS No. 68). In this case as well as in the far majority of partial settlements, my reading of the sources suggests that the settlement of remaining issues was relegated to further negotiations, but that the parties proceeded without any explicit timetable or master plan for the resolution of other aspects of the claim.

Using these coding rules, I identified 130 partial settlements that were pursued in 60 different territorial claims and involved 58 unique dyads and 62 different countries. Of the 60 claims in which the parties concluded at least one partial settlement, 24 (40%) made two partial settlements, ten (17%) adopted three, five (8%) made four partial settlements, one dyad negotiated six (2%) and one dyad concluded seven partial settlements (2%). Overall, the most active decades for partial settlements were the 1920s with 19% of settlements, the 1990s with 18%, the 1930s and 1970s with 14% each, and the 1950s with 12%. Partial settlements have been most popular in the Middle East (33%), followed by Asia (25%), Latin America (20%), Africa (15%), and Europe (8%).

In the empirical analysis, I use these newly collected data to code a dummy variable for whether a partial settlement is in effect in a given dyadic-territorial-claim-year.\textsuperscript{10} There are 897 (15.8%) dyadic-territorial-claim-years in which the parties have at least one ongoing partial settlement. My focus is on partial settlements that are in force, since both the expectations

\textsuperscript{10} Partial settlements that fail immediately, because they are rejected in the ratification process or one or both sides refuse to comply with the newly negotiated settlement, enter the data for the year they are signed but are coded 0 thereafter.
formulated in my theoretical argument and the expectations of those skeptical of piecemeal approaches concern the longer-term effect of partial settlements that enter and remain in effect. \footnote{11}{In a robustness check I coded all years subsequent to the signing of an initial partial settlement as having such a settlement in force, irrespective of whether the partial settlement failed or not. The results are in line with those presented here with one exception: a conflict-reducing effect of three or more partial settlements only appears in the fixed-effects model.}

**Dependent Variables: Military Conflict and Full Claim Resolution**

To evaluate the effect of partial settlements on the likelihood of military conflict, I rely on Maoz’s (2005) dyadic MID data v. 2.0 for 1919-1992 and on the Correlates of War (COW) dyadic MID data v. 3.1 (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004) for 1993-2001. Because territorial settlements should not necessarily be expected to affect a dyad’s propensity to engage in non-territorial MIDs, I limit my examination to MIDs in which the issue at stake was territory. This is still a demanding test of the pacifying effect of partial territorial settlements, since these MIDs may be about territory not covered by the partial settlement and that the partial settlement should thus not directly regulate. However, because the theoretical argument is about the broader effects of partial settlements, that is, their ability to reduce territorial tensions between the adversaries more generally, it is appropriate to examine whether partial settlements reduce, or possibly exacerbate, any territorial conflict between the states. I create two binary variables that reflect different levels of hostility. The first dummy codes whether the parties experienced a territorial MID of any level of hostility and the second codes whether the parties experienced a violent territorial MID (i.e. a level 4 or 5 MID). 392 (7.1%) dyadic-territorial-claim years experienced at least one territorial MID and 288 (5.2%) experienced a level 4 or 5 MID.
The second measure of the effectiveness of a piecemeal strategy considers whether partial settlements facilitate the ultimate peaceful resolution of all outstanding territorial claims in the dyad. To determine whether and when the parties were able to settle the last of their territorial disputes, I take advantage of Huth and Allee’s (2002) and Huth et al.’s (2011) dating of the end of territorial claims. I code a complete peaceful settlement of claims as occurring when Huth et al.’s end date for the last remaining territorial claim in the dyad coincides with a peaceful bilateral agreement, an arbitration/adjudication award, or a plebiscite. A peaceful comprehensive claim resolution is reached in 108 of the territorial claims, 1.9% of the dyadic-territorial-claim years.

*Control Variables*

When assessing the effect of partial settlements on the likelihood of militarized conflict and the complete peaceful settlement of the claim, it is important to account for the intractability level of the territorial dispute. I thus control for a series of factors that reflect how difficult it should be to settle the claim peacefully and that have been found to be important in previous studies of similar dependent variables (e.g. Hensel 2001; Huth et al. 2011; Gent and Shannon 2010; Mitchell and Hensel 2007). First, I include two measures of the level of hostility in the dyad. *History of conflict* codes the number of territorial MIDs in the preceding ten years of the claim. *Strategic rivalry* is a dummy variable coded based on Thompson (2001) and identifies pairs of states that perceive each other as hostile and are locked in tense competition. Both variables should be associated with a greater likelihood of MIDs and a decreased likelihood of a full peaceful resolution of the claim. Second, I control for two indicators that suggest that the parties’ relationship may be more cooperative than conflictual. *Alliance ties* is coded 1 if the parties share a defense, offense, consultation, or neutrality pact (Leeds and Mattes 2007). *Joint
democracy is coded 1 if both states have polity2 scores of six or higher, or, when Polity data (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013) is missing, if Cheibub et al. (2010) code the regime types of both countries to be democratic. Both measures should be correlated with a decreased likelihood of conflict and an increased probability of a peaceful comprehensive resolution. Third, I control for issue salience. Salient issues may be conceived of as indivisible and thus may make reaching a peaceful compromise difficult and conflict more likely. Using data from Huth and Allee (2002) and Huth et al. (2011), I create a dummy variable, issue salience, that is coded 1 when at least some of the territory disputed by the parties was ethnically, economically, or strategically valuable. Finally, I control for relative capabilities. This variable is operationalized as the natural log of the ratio of the stronger state’s Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score to the weaker sides’ CINC Score (Singer 1987). A larger stronger-to-weaker ratio reflects power asymmetry and should be negatively correlated with MIDs and positively correlated with a peaceful resolution of the entire claim.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{Statistical Method}

The unit of analysis is the dyadic-territorial-claim-year. Given the binary-time-series-cross-section (BTSCS) nature of the data, I use logit models with cubic polynomials to correct for temporal dependence where necessary (Carter and Signorino 2010). Two potential complications arise for these particular data.

First, because I rely on Huth and co-authors’ territorial claim data, my observation period begins in 1919. However, some claims started already in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century and are thus left-

\textsuperscript{12} Descriptive statistics for the control variables are available in the web appendix. In an additional analysis, I included controls for colonial vs. homeland territory and the number of disputed areas in the dyad. The results are robust.
truncated. There is no reason to expect that the truncated claims are particularly likely or unlikely to have partial settlements, MIDs, or to end in a peaceful comprehensive settlement in the observation period. Thus, left truncation should not introduce bias. As a check, I created a data set that codes territorial-claim-dyads, including information on the existence of partial settlements, from the claims’ start dates in the 19th century.\textsuperscript{13} The results are similar to those presented here, but because these data are more tentative, given that I had to make coding decisions that may deviate from Huth and co-authors’ rules and given that I had to extrapolate some of their variables to the earlier period, I present the results for 1919-2001 period.

Second, there are several ways a dyadic-territorial-claims case may exit the data. Claims are right-censored if they were ongoing at the end of the observation period in 2001 or if the object of the claim gained independence. Alternatively, claims can leave the data as the result of a peaceful settlement, a settlement that was accomplished through force, or through unilateral renunciation of the claim. For the MID models, I treat claims that were resolved peacefully or through unilateral renunciation as right-censored. In a robustness check, I created a data set that codes MID occurrences through 2001, irrespective of whether the claim had terminated or not. The results are consistent with the ones reported here. For the complete peaceful claim resolution model, I treat claim terminations that were the result of force or unilateral renunciations as censored. I thus employ a latent survivor time approach. If the claim had not ended in a peaceful settlement and had been observed for longer, it might have terminated through one of the other mechanisms and I assume that, conditional on the covariates, the risks of experiencing different types of claim endings are independent. As an alternative approach that relaxes this assumption I

\textsuperscript{13} I rely on the provisional ICOW territorial claims data version 1.01 (Frederick, Hensel, and Macauley 2014) to identify the start date of claims in the 19th century.
also estimate a multinomial probit model of the effect of partial settlements on peaceful claim resolution, violent claim termination, and unilateral renunciation. Partial settlements increase the likelihood of peaceful claim resolution (p=.01), are negatively correlated with violent claim termination (p=.09), and positively but not significantly (p=.812) associated with unilateral renunciation.

VI. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Columns 1-4 in Table 1 display the results for the analysis of the effect of partial settlements on the likelihood of any MID or a violent MID. In addition to pooled analysis, I also estimate models that include claim-specific fixed effects to correct for any remaining heterogeneity in the propensity for militarized conflict among different claim-dyads. The coefficients in the fixed-effects models thus capture the average within-unit variation. Note that including claim-specific fixed effects leads dyadic territorial claim cases that never experienced a (violent) MID to be dropped from the analyses—139 claims and 2,409 dyad-years (45% of the observations) are dropped in the general MIDs model and 150 claims and 2,760 dyad-years (51% of the observations) in the violent MIDs model. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered on the claim.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

As is evident in Table 1 columns 1-4, the coefficient for partial settlement is negative but not statistically significant in any of the models. Thus, while partial settlements do not appear to make conflict more likely, as some arguments critical of a piecemeal approach suggest, there is

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14 All additional analyses and robustness checks are available in the web appendix.

15 I dropped years in which a MID was ongoing and no new MID began.
also no evidence to indicate that partial settlements have a conflict-dampening effect. H1 is not supported by the data.

One possibility is that the effect of a piecemeal approach unfolds only after additional settlement steps have taken place. Especially if the parties start by tackling “easier” issues first, it may require more than one partial settlement to decrease tensions and build trust between the signatories. To determine whether the conclusion of additional partial settlements is associated with a significant decrease in conflict, I create indicators of whether the claim-dyad had at least two partial settlements, at least three partial settlements, etc. In the pooled model, claim-dyads with at least two partial settlements are still not significantly less likely to experience a MID (any MID or a violent MID), but, when accounting for claim-level fixed effects, the coefficient for partial settlement is negative and statistically significant. Dyads that conclude three or more partial settlements are significantly less likely to experience any MID or a violent MID in both the pooled and fixed-effects analysis. Thus, it appears that partial settlements may have a conflict-dampening effect, but that this effect only manifests itself in later stages of the piecemeal approach. However, because only relatively few claim-dyads (12 cases) conclude three or more settlements, these results should be seen as tentative.

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16. 14 claim-dyads with only one partial settlement in place experience MIDs. Of these 14 dyads, eight go on to make additional partial settlements. Thus, it is not only claims that experience no MIDs, i.e. “easy” cases, that opt for further settlements.

17. This effect is not simply the result of third partial settlements resolving all remaining claims. Of the 12 cases with a third partial settlement, eight are ongoing after the third partial settlement is concluded. None of these cases experience further conflict. Thus, even when not all issues are
With regard to the control variables, the findings are mostly as expected, but some differences between the pooled and fixed effects models emerge. When parties have a hostile relationship, as reflected by their history of conflict and the existence of a rivalry between them, MIDs are more likely. Similarly, the parties are more likely to experience a MID if at least some of the territory at stake is salient. The findings on these three variables are stronger in the pooled models, but the fixed effects models reflect the same trends. By contrast, the conflict-reducing effect of joint democracy is clearer in the models that focus on the variation that individual dyads display across time than in the pooled models. Counter to expectations, shared alliance ties is positive and statistically significant in the two fixed-effects models (but not in the pooled models), suggesting that when the parties have an alliance they are more likely to fight than when they do not. Relative capabilities is not statistically significant in any of the models.

The second criterion to judge the efficacy of a piecemeal approach is the ability of initial partial agreements to put the parties on a path towards the settlement of remaining territorial claims. Model 5 reports the results of a pooled logit model of the relationship between partial settlements and the full peaceful resolution of the dispute. A likelihood ratio test suggests that settled after additional agreements, these agreements still appear to be associated with less conflict.

\textsuperscript{18} The inclusion of claim-level fixed effects is particularly problematic for this DV. Unlike in the models for H1, where fixed effects should bias against the hypothesis, here the inclusion of fixed effects biases the findings in favor of H2. All cases in which the claim did not end peacefully are dropped and we observe the effect of partial settlements only in cases of successful claim termination. However, there may be many cases of partial settlements that did not lead to the full
time polynomials to account for duration dependence are unnecessary in this model and are thus not included.\footnote{The results are similar when time polynomials are included.} As before, I estimate robust standard errors clustered on the claim.

As can be seen in column 5, the coefficient for \textit{partial settlement} is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the full peaceful resolution of remaining claims is more likely when the parties have concluded at least one partial settlement. This is in line with H2, but the effect of partial settlements appears substantively small at first glance: the likelihood of a comprehensive resolution of territorial claims increases by only 1.6\% when the parties have a partial settlement. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that the peaceful termination of all territorial claims in a dyad is a rare event in the data. Holding all other variables at their means and modes, the probability of a claim terminating peacefully is only 1.8\% when there is no partial settlement. This probability rises to 3.4\% when the parties have concluded at least one partial settlement. Partial settlements thus almost double the probability of the full peaceful resolution of the parties’ territorial disputes.

In regards to the control variables, I find that \textit{strategic rivalry} is negatively correlated with peaceful claim termination, while countries that are allied are more likely to find a peaceful resolution of their territorial dispute. These findings are in line with expectations. More surprising is the finding of a negative statistically significant relationship between \textit{relative capabilities} and comprehensive claim resolution. If one side is significantly stronger than the other, i.e. if there is power asymmetry, peaceful claim termination is less rather than more likely. The estimated effect of partial settlements is stronger in a fixed-effects model.
Furthermore, while, as expected, *history of conflict* and *issue salience* are negative and *joint democracy* is positive, these variables are not statistically significant at conventional levels.

**Discussion**

Overall, the results lend support to the more optimistic view of partial settlements embraced in this paper, but also reveal some limitations of the piecemeal approach that were anticipated by those skeptical of partial settlements. A piecemeal approach does not seem to prevent conflict in the short run—especially if only one partial settlement has been concluded—but it does have the potential to limit conflict in the longer run. There is tentative evidence to suggest that once parties have concluded additional partial settlements, militarized disputes become less likely. Moreover, the findings show that partial settlements set the stage for the final resolution of remaining claims. As we know from existing work, once all outstanding claims are settled, the parties can partake in all the benefits of regulated borders, including the lower risk for conflict and the greater potential for economic gains (Owsiak 2012; Schultz 2014; Simmons 2002).

Yet, before concluding that partial settlements are a potentially valuable dispute settlement strategy, it is important to consider alternative explanations for the correlations uncovered in the analyses. First, if partial settlements are chosen in territorial claims cases that are particularly easy to resolve our inferences are biased and partial settlements appear misleadingly successful in standard regression analysis. Note that the fact that the parties opted for a partial agreement rather than a comprehensive one indicates that settling the claim was not necessarily straightforward. If the parties had found it easy to tackle their territorial disagreements, they would have resolved the dispute in one step rather than choosing a piecemeal approach. Furthermore, the finding of no conflict-reducing effect of initial partial
settlements also suggests that these settlements are probably not chosen in particularly amicable situations. Still, it is important to probe the results further.

In one robustness check I restrict the sample to territorial-claim-years where the countries had either already experienced conflict over the disputed territory or were strategic rivals. These are territorial claim cases in which there is reason to believe that the parties’ relationship is hostile and the claim should thus be difficult to resolve peacefully. I find substantively similar results. In another robustness check, I employ a coarsened exact matching (CEM) procedure (Iacus, King, and Porro 2012) to more effectively remove potential differences between treatment and control cases. I match partial settlement cases with control cases (dyad-years with no partial settlement) that are similar on the values of the control variables that get at the intractability level of the conflict. I then examine whether a MID and/or the complete resolution of the claim is less/more likely within 10 years. The post-matching results are in line with the findings reported here: 1) initial partial settlements do not reduce conflict, but additional partial settlements appear to be associated with a decreased probability of conflict; 2) partial settlements, even initial ones, significantly increase the likelihood of peaceful claim resolution.

A second concern is that the apparent effectiveness of a piecemeal approach might be the result not of the decision to parcel out the issues, but of the efforts of third parties. Existing research suggests that especially binding third-party efforts are a key predictor of success in dispute resolution (e.g. Gent and Shannon 2010) and I include partial settlements that are the result of arbitration/adjudication in the analyses. To investigate the extent to which the results

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20 Partial settlements are significantly positively related to the full peaceful resolution of the claims (p=.053).

21 More details on these robustness checks can be found in the web appendix.
may be driven by the inclusion of these cases, I drop entire dyadic-territorial-claim cases in which at least one partial settlement was the result of an award. The findings are similar. This suggests that even when parties do not benefit from binding conflict management, a piecemeal approach can be effective.

The efficacy of a step-wise approach in bilateral dispute resolution can be seen in the case of the Sino-Soviet/Russian boundary. Their 7,100-kilometer border constituted a major irritant, leading to serious hostilities in 1969 and to a heavily militarized border subsequently. During negotiations in the late 1980s, progress was made on most of the eastern border, but the western border as well as the Heixiazi (Bolshoy Ussuriysky and Tarabarov) and Abagaitu (Bolshoy) islands in the east defied resolution. While Gorbachev was willing to compromise on the islands, he faced significant resistance from members of his government (Calvert 2004). Deng Xiaoping agreed to shelve these issues and to proceed with an agreement that delimited 98% of the eastern boundary, signed in 1991 (Hyer 1996). Once the demarcation process started, local resistance to the agreement, which required Russia to hand over some 700 islands, manifested itself, although much of the agitation seems to have been the result of domestic political tensions between Russian regions that had their subsidies cut and Moscow (e.g. Wilson 2004). While local politicians stoked nationalist fervor, other powerful actors advocated for stronger ties with China. For example, the military-industrial sector was interested in selling equipment to China (Wilson 2004) and the resolution of contentious border disputes was ostensibly a prerequisite for such sales.

During the demarcation process, Yeltsin signaled his trustworthiness by repeatedly privately and publicly assuring China of Russia’s intention to uphold the 1991 agreement. In response, China demonstrated its willingness to cooperate by making some concessions, such as
allowing Russia to keep a military gravesite (Iwashita 2005). In 1994 Moscow and Beijing then concluded an agreement to settle their western border, which had shrunk to only 55km after the disintegration of the USSR. The two countries’ willingness to adhere to the 1991 settlement, to be responsive to each other’s concerns, and to resolve additional border disagreements contributed to a significant reduction in tensions by the late 1990s. Border troops were substantially reduced and the Sino-Russian relationship evolved from one characterized by mutual distrust to a “strategic partnership” (Wilson 2004).

In 1999, the two countries completed the demarcation of their eastern border minus the two disputed islands. Around this time, local resistance against the 1991 agreement also subsided (Wilson 2004). It appears that the delays characteristic of a piecemeal approach do not necessarily only favor spoilers, but can improve the prospects for further settlements by allowing governments to outwait domestic agitators. In 2004, Putin and Hu Jintao finally signed an agreement on the remaining islands. This final settlement came as a surprise to many, as these particular claims had been seen as especially intractable (Maxwell 2007; Iwashita 2005). In 1991, their resolution was left to “a future generation” and expectations for a settlement were bleak (Voskresensky 1991; Maxwell 2007). Thus, the final settlement of the border through the 2004 agreement should be seen as a major success that would probably not have been possible without the previous steps taken by the two sides. Since 2004, trade and other cooperation have taken off and, while in some circles there remain concerns that China may raise territorial claims again in the future, the Russo-Chinese relationship has clearly been strengthened as the result of the settlement of their border.
VII. CONCLUSION

In many conflict situations the contentious issues are complex and varied enough that the parties might consider a stepwise approach to dispute resolution, chipping away at underlying disagreements a few at a time. But how viable is such a piecemeal strategy? I argue that a piecemeal approach should be quite successful. By easing tensions, building trust, generating incentives for further agreements, and providing information and experience that can guide additional negotiations, partial settlements should help reduce conflict between the adversaries and facilitate the full resolution of their disagreements. Yet, this optimistic view of partial settlements is not without its detractors. A number of concerns have been leveled against a piecemeal approach and a systematic empirical test of the efficacy of partial settlements has thus become imperative.

Using newly collected data on partial settlements in worldwide territorial claims between 1919 and 2001, I find that while a piecemeal strategy does not necessarily lead to a reduction of military tensions in its early stages, it can help with the achievement of more limited immediate goals and pave the way for the resolution of outstanding disagreements in the longer run. As demonstrated by the Chinese-Russian example, it appears that, especially when a comprehensive settlement is not immediately feasible, a step-wise approach may constitute a promising policy option.

In addition to providing policy-relevant insights on the effectiveness of a piecemeal approach, this paper also opens up avenues for future scholarly research. In particular, it will be worthwhile to delve deeper into the details of stepwise approaches. This paper effectively treats partial settlements as uniform, but they may vary in their scope and the difficulty level of issues they address as well as in their spacing across time. An analysis of different types of partial
settlements can provide additional information on how to make a piecemeal approach more effective.

Another important extension would take this work and apply it to other types of conflict. Many of the arguments presented here should be generalizable to disputes over issues other than territory, but more careful theoretical and empirical assessment is called for. One particularly interesting question is whether a stepwise approach also holds promise for the resolution of intrastate conflict. We know that civil wars are often particularly difficult to resolve, given pervasive mistrust and the lack of enforceability of a settlement. A piecemeal approach, such as the one currently undertaken in Colombia, might allow the parties to build good will and negotiate increasingly complex issues. Further examination of the Colombian case and other gradual conflict resolution efforts is important considering the threats to international security that civil wars pose today.

While existing work on conflict management and conflict resolution has produced many interesting and important insights, most of these pertain to which actors and venues for conflict management are more or less successful. A shift in focus to the agenda and design of management efforts not only provides scholars with a fuller understanding of the conflict resolution process but also forms the foundation for potentially useful advice for policy-makers.
REFERENCES


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## TABLE 1: Logistic Regression Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Any MID --Pooled</th>
<th>(2) Any MID --Fixed Effects</th>
<th>(3) Violent MID --Pooled</th>
<th>(4) Violent MID --Fixed Effects</th>
<th>(5) Full Peaceful Claim Resolution --Pooled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partial Settlement</td>
<td>-0.139 (0.253)</td>
<td>-0.564 (0.498)</td>
<td>-0.160 (0.305)</td>
<td>-0.638 (0.544)</td>
<td>0.629*** (0.236)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Conflict</td>
<td>0.232*** (0.046)</td>
<td>0.033 (0.057)</td>
<td>0.229*** (0.059)</td>
<td>0.065 (0.077)</td>
<td>-0.123 (0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Rivalry</td>
<td>1.101*** (0.188)</td>
<td>2.084*** (0.492)</td>
<td>1.163*** (0.226)</td>
<td>2.974*** (0.649)</td>
<td>-0.831*** (0.285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Salience</td>
<td>0.995** (0.395)</td>
<td>1.354 (1.052)</td>
<td>0.832** (0.371)</td>
<td>0.613 (1.003)</td>
<td>-0.359 (0.284)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>-0.438 (0.270)</td>
<td>-0.795*** (0.288)</td>
<td>-0.750*** (0.253)</td>
<td>-0.971*** (0.294)</td>
<td>0.077 (0.277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Alliance</td>
<td>-0.082 (0.160)</td>
<td>0.816*** (0.306)</td>
<td>-0.183 (0.148)</td>
<td>0.653** (0.327)</td>
<td>0.408* (0.209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Capabilities</td>
<td>-0.051 (0.051)</td>
<td>-0.149 (0.269)</td>
<td>-0.057 (0.061)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.253)</td>
<td>-0.224*** (0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Yrs.</td>
<td>-0.342*** (0.044)</td>
<td>-0.309*** (0.043)</td>
<td>-0.328*** (0.051)</td>
<td>-0.281*** (0.048)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Yrs.$^{2}$</td>
<td>0.013*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.013*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.013*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.012*** (0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Yrs.$^{3}$</td>
<td>-0.000*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.000*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.000*** (0.000)</td>
<td>-0.000*** (0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.038*** (0.451)</td>
<td>-3.200*** (0.424)</td>
<td>-3.145*** (0.424)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5,389</td>
<td>2,980</td>
<td>5,389</td>
<td>2,629</td>
<td>5,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Likelihood</td>
<td>-1013.197</td>
<td>-696.827</td>
<td>-815.395</td>
<td>554.583</td>
<td>-511.398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Coefficients and robust standard errors clustered on the claim are presented. Significance tests are two-tailed. *** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$. A likelihood ratio test suggests that time polynomials are unnecessary in Model 5 and are thus not included.