Seeing Red in Black and White: Exploring Racial Differences in the Mobilizing Impact of Anger on Political Activity

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Abstract
As numerous studies—and the recent election season—make abundantly clear, anger is a powerful mobilizing force driving electoral participation. Drawing on frameworks provided by cognitive appraisal theory and black ideology, this paper develops an argument explaining why anger arising from policy threats does not mobilize African Americans for political action as it does for whites. I contend thusly that cues of policy threats will lead to racially disparate patterns of participation among blacks and whites that should be particularly pronounced in racially contentious political climates. Analyses of data from the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) reveal two key sets of findings. First, Black survey respondents report feeling angry during the 2016 election at significantly lower rates than White respondents. Second, reporting anger exerts a significantly weaker mobilizing impact on Black political behavior relative to Whites, across a wide domain of actions. These findings carry significant implications for our understandings of the role of emotions in political communication and Black political behavior.
Introduction

For all of the pundits seeking to make sense of the tumultuous Presidential election season, no one seems to capture the tone of the current political climate better than Howard Beale, the fictional TV anchor from the 40-year old satirical film *Network*. His infamous declaration “I’m mad as hell and I’m not going to take this anymore!” may encapsulate perfectly the anger that appeared to be such a mobilizing force among rank and file citizens during the election season. Indeed, prior work by Valentino, Gregorowicz and Groenendyk (2009) and Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, and Hutchings (2011) provides evidence that anger over the prospect of the non-favored candidate winning the Presidential election increases the likelihood of turnout. These findings are consistent with a broader body of work spanning psychology and political behavior, which indicates political cues that emphasize prospective threat are more effective mobilizers of political action than cues emphasizing prospective opportunity (see Campbell 2003; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Miller and Krosnick 2004).

But according to recent surveys conducted by NBC News and Rasmussen, it appears not everyone is equally feeling “mad as hell” in the current political environment. A striking racial disparity emerges when respondents address whether they feel angrier this year than last year, with 54% of whites feeling angrier, compared to only 33% of African Americans.1 Given the stimulating effects of anger on electoral participation, this apparent anger gap could have significant implications for the turnout of these respective groups. It is critical, therefore, to determine the extent to which this gap is indicative of constant, systematic differences in the emotional responses engendered by whites and blacks to their political environment.

In this paper, I relay findings from analyses of 2016 CMPS data to demonstrate that the gap revealed by the survey is not limited to the activation or expression of anger across racial groups. Indeed, Black respondents in the CMPS report feeling significantly less anger than their White counterparts. But another type of racial anger gap also emerges from the data. Reported feelings of anger over the election have much weaker effects on the political participation of Black respondents relative to their White counterparts. That African Americans would both feel

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1 The NBC News poll was conducted in collaboration with Survey Monkey and Esquire. http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/poll-whites-republicans-rank-angriest-americans-n488636

Phoenix, *Seeing Red* 2
less anger in this election cycle and be less mobilized by their anger may seem counterintuitive. By integrating literatures from political psychology and Black identity and ideology, I aim to provide a framework that explains why these phenomena may not only be far from counterintuitive, they should be expected.

**Literature Review & Theoretical Claims**

Why is anger generally expected to translate to action more effectively than other emotion states? Two key components of anger distinguish it conceptually from other negative emotions. One, anger is a strong feeling of displeasure or belligerence. Two, this feeling is aroused by a perceived wrong or slight. The intensity of the feeling and the element of injustice distinguish anger from negative emotions such as disappointment and sadness.

When in a state of anger, people possess a clear sense of agency regarding how to deal with the source frustrating one’s desired ends. Further, in a state of anger, people will rely less on acquired information in determining their preferred course of action, going so far as to downplay the risks associated with those actions (Huddy, Feldman and Cassese 2007). For these reasons, anger is believed to be a state of action.

Why might Black Americans be less prone to respond to the electoral environment with anger than whites? Approaches that explore the interaction of cognition and affect lay the groundwork for answering this question. Cognitive appraisal theory (Lerner and Keltner 2000; 2001) focuses on the distinct environmental origins of various emotions, and the manner in which individuals cognitively process those emotions in a way that informs their subsequent course of action. The essential premise of appraisal theory is articulated by Scherer (2003, in Spezio and Adolphs p. 82): “people evaluate events in terms of the perceived relevance for their current needs and goals, including their ability to cope with consequences and the compatibility of the underlying actions with social norms and self-ideals.”

This synopsis emphasizes the interaction of micro and macro-level forces that influences how an individual perceives prospective changes to her environment. Therefore, racial differences in how people respond emotionally and behaviorally to cues provided during election season must originate in differences in their cognitive assessments of the environment. Whereas whites generally view the political environment through interpretive lenses that augment their
sense of control, blacks view the environment through lenses that emphasize their incapacity to
affect change.

By identifying the distinct ideological narratives drawn upon by whites and blacks to
interpret their political environment and their respective roles within it, I acknowledge the
influential role played by individuals’ deeply engrained beliefs regarding the political system’s
responsiveness and fairness when processing the cues of prospective policy change disseminated
during election seasons. By failing to account for the impact of these worldviews on individual
emotional reactions to such cues, current scholarship cannot provide an accurate framework for
understanding how African Americans face a unique set of considerations and calculations when
facing the prospect of a new Presidential administration.

The wide gulf separating the opinions of Blacks and Whites across the full spectrum of
political issues is no artifact of past generations divided by segregation. Nor is it attributable
simply to partisan differences. As Hutchings (2009) demonstrates, significant rifts in opinion
are present even among black and white liberals, as well as among Blacks and Whites from the
millennial age cohort. This significant divide reflects fundamental differences in how Blacks
and Whites perceive their sociopolitical environment. For instance, Dawson (2011, p. xv)
argues Whites and Black people have cultivated distinct worldviews that flow from divergent
patterns of interpreting events in the world around them. His examination of the dissimilar
reactions of Blacks and Whites to Hurricane Katrina highlights the divergent narratives drawn
upon by white and blacks in making sense of political and cultural phenomena:

Was it a tragic event in which a large number of citizens proved unexpectedly
vulnerable to a freak accident? Or was this business as usual? That is to say,
proof, once again that some Americans count for more than others, and that skin
color provides a brutally direct indication of who does count and who does not.

The underlying notion here is that the respective placement of Whites and Blacks in
the sociopolitical environment consequently shapes the meaning both groups attach to
significant political phenomena. This constitutes a fundamental premise of cognitive
sociology, as stated by Zerubavel (1997; in Young 2004, p. 134); “not only does our social

Phoenix, Seeing Red 4
environment affect how we perceive the world; it also helps determine what actually ‘enters’ our minds in the first place.”

Studies on racial differences in how individuals view recent political phenomena suggest that for African Americans, the notion that black interests and demands are subjugated by the sociopolitical system enters their minds “first,” thus shaping their interpretation and evaluation of these phenomena. For example, the examination by Avery (2007) into how partisans viewed the 2000 Presidential election results revealed that blacks disproportionately viewed the outcome as illegitimate. Meanwhile, White, Philpot, Wylie, and McGowan (2007) find that a majority of African Americans viewed the governmental response to Hurricane Katrina as a product of racial bias, in contrast to a majority of white respondents who viewed the response as an instance of bureaucratic inefficiency. Finally, in an editorial post explaining the virtual absence of African Americans from the Occupy movement—despite Blacks being disproportionately victimized by the economic policies being opposed by the movement—Stacy Patton (2011) wrote:

Blacks have historically suffered the income inequality and job scarcity that the Wall Street protesters are now railing against. Perhaps black America’s absence is sending a message to the Occupiers: “We told you so! Nothing will change. We’ve been here already. It’s hopeless.

These recent examples should inform our expectations of how African Americans generally perceive the cues being disseminated in the current environment. When, for instance, African Americans perceive Presidential candidates to be denouncing the claims of the Black Lives Matter movement as illegitimate, or deeming racial issues as secondary to class issues, the interpretive lens of Black subjugation causes them to views such messaging as emblematic of the political system’s historical diminishment of Black needs. This overarching perception of the U.S. sociopolitical system as generally unresponsive (at best) or openly hostile (at worst) to black interests is reflected in the lower levels of efficacy and political trust exhibited by African Americans relative to whites (see Aberbach and Walker 1970, Pierce and Carey Jr. 1971). These disparities reflect Blacks’ general perceptions that they have fewer resources at their
disposal to affect changes in the policy environment, and less agency to influence the political environment generally.

Reliance on a group-centric heuristic that emphasizes Blacks’ collective lack of agency within the American political system could cause individual African Americans to be more likely to express anxiety or despondency than anger in response to cues from the election environment perceived as threatening. This expectation is consistent with cognitive appraisal theory, which posits that whether one responds to a threat with anger or anxiety is determined by whether she possess senses of attribution and control relative to the threat.

Alternately, the heuristic of Black subjugation could cause black individuals to engender an emotional response to electoral threats that is relatively muted along all negative dimensions—notably, both anger and fear. Further assessing work on Black attitudes sheds light on why the response of African Americans to threatening cues from the electoral environment may be best characterized by a sense of resignation.

Public health research indicates that Black people report being less adversely impacted by race-related stressors relative to whites, despite encountering such stressors at a higher rate. This finding is generally attributed to African Americans’ cultivation of support networks that provide them with outlets for expressing their anguish over racial discrimination (Williams, Yu, Jackson and Anderson 1997). This work suggests the mechanisms blacks develop to alleviate feelings of vulnerability and distress in the face of duress prevent them from feeling emotions conveying powerless when encountering threatening rhetoric during campaigns. These mechanisms, therefore, can preempt the emergence of anxiety or sadness in response to threats emergent in the political environment.

But why would these mechanism not embolden African Americans to feel a sense of action-inducing anger in response? Black individuals are confident in their capacity to effectively meet the challenges to their personal and collective senses of self-worth that come from a racially stratified sociopolitical system. Yet when threatened, they remain skeptical about their capacity to mount effective challenges to that political system itself. Given the prevalence of threats to African Americans in the political environment, they constantly weigh the choice between maintaining a level of detachment from the political system, so as to preserve a positive self-concept, or taking on political action that they are conditioned to believe carries a high risk.
of failure to meet its achieved objectives. The risk for Black people extends beyond failure to achieve the desired action; they risk diminishing their self-concept.

Crocker and Knight (2005, p. 200) assert “people want to believe that they are worthy and valuable human beings, and this desire drives their behavior.” If Black Americans’ interactions with the political environment consistently serve as a reminder of their marginalized status within the state, then for the sake of their sense of personal worth, they will ultimately choose a course of refraining from further interaction. By and large, many of the relevant threats that emerge in Blacks’ political environment are simply added to their long-running script on the subjugation of Black interests. These threats are consistent with African Americans’ internalized beliefs about what they must contend with as members of a marginalized group in the U.S. They represent not what blacks must face in the environment, but more fundamentally what it means to be Black in said environment. Blacks’ cognitive contextualizing of the electoral threat as part of the cost of being black causes them to form an emotional response that is constrained in large part by an ever-present sense of resignation.

Resignation is defined as acceptance of something perceived to be both undesirable and inevitable. I conceptualize it not as an affective state itself, but more as as a longstanding cognitive predisposition—one that is primed by the threat cue as the individual engenders an emotional response to the threat. It is therefore the presence of resignation among African Americans—emanating from their racialized lens of interpreting the political system—that dampens the arousal of a mobilizing anger among Black individuals.

In the analyses that follow, I examine whether Black and White respondents differ in the propensity to express anger and fear in response to the 2016 election (which certainly seemed to produce no shortage of incidents that left people across the political spectrum either fuming or quivering). I then examine racial differences in the associations between anger and participation in various political activities. In the following sections, I describe the data and research design and present hypotheses related to race, anger and action.

**Data and Research Design**

The Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) in a rich study of the attitudes and actions of an ethnically diverse set of respondents. The survey includes questions gauging respondents’ emotional reactions to the racially charged 2016 race. Additionally, it
includes questions soliciting respondents’ perceptions of government responsiveness to the collective demands of one’s racial group. Compared to conventional efficacy measures, these questions may more effectively tap into African Americans’ assessments of their collective capacity to extract leverage from the political system. Such assessments should inform Black Americans’ perceptions of their agency in the context of the election, which could subsequently influence the emotions engendered in response to it. Finally, the study asks if respondents participated in political activities running the gamut from electoral to community-oriented to counter-institutional.

For the first sets of analyses, the dependent variables measure frequency with which respondents felt the following emotions during the election season: anger, fear, sadness, pride, and hopefulness. As these are four-category variables ranging from “not at all” to “all the time,” ordered logistic regression analyses are run. The second sets of analyses use as dependent variables dichotomous measures of whether respondents took part in specific activities in the past year. These analyses use logistic regressions.

I did not create indexes of the various political activities, choosing instead to run separate logistic regressions or each individual activity. But I did categorize the activities conceptually along the following dimensions. **Electoral** actions comprise the activities directly intended to affect an election outcome. This includes voting, campaigning for a candidate, contributing money to a campaign, and adorning oneself with campaign signage such as a bumper sticker. **Community and governmental** actions comprise activities aimed at addressing local issues or getting a need met from political actors or institutions. Included under this category are working together with others to solve a local problem, attending a meeting to address a local matter, and directly contacting a public official to resolve an issue. Finally, **discourse and disruptive** labels actions centered either on discussing politics with others, or engaging in counter-institutional or status quo challenging activities. This includes discussing politics with friends and family, discussing political content on social media, participating in a protest, and signing a petition.

These conceptual categories may illuminate whether anger mobilizes Black and White respondents toward distinct domains of action. For instance, could anger stimulate Whites toward greater electoral activity, while steering Blacks toward counter-institutional actions? All dependent, independent and control variables are coded 0 to 1.
Race, Threat and Anger—Hypotheses

Consistent with my proposition that a racialized lens of interpretation engenders an anger dampening resignation among Black Americans, I hypothesize that Black respondents will report feeling anger over the election at lower rates than White respondents:

\[ H_1: \text{African Americans will report less anger than White Americans.} \]

The argument laid out earlier also provides for the possibility that even among Blacks who express anger over their political environment, the overarching sense of resignation will inhibit the mobilizing impact of anger on their participation in political activity. Accordingly, I test the following hypothesis:

\[ H_2: \text{Anger will exhibit a weaker association with political activity for Black respondents than it exhibits for White respondents.} \]

Findings

Figure 1 displays the distributions of responses to the anger question across four racial and ethnic groups represented in the survey, absent controls.

[Figure 1 about here]

Patterns do not dramatically differ across groups. Black respondents appear to be slightly more likely than White respondents to report little or no anger. Asian respondents appear to be the least angry. Turning to an ordered logistic model regressing each of the racial groups on anger makes the racial differences more clear. Table 1 shows the results of the model, which includes as control variables a number of demographic, resource and engagement measures. Usually included in standard models of electoral participation, these controls should be good indicators of respondents’ capacities to engage with and invest in electoral politics. They should therefore correlate with respondents’ emotional reactions to the electoral environment.

[Table 1 about here]
Controlling for the other factors, Black respondents report feelings of anger over the election at significantly lower rates than Whites. While the magnitude of the deficit for African Americans is smaller than that for Asian Americans, it remains notable, with a coefficient effect more than double the standard error term. For greater ease of interpretation, Figure 2 below displays the predicted probabilities of White and Black respondents reporting each category of anger. While both groups have the highest probability of reporting the second to highest category, Blacks are overall more likely than Whites to report the lowest two categories, while the reverse holds for the highest two categories.

[Figure 2 about here]

Could this divergence in reports of anger be evidence of racial resignation inhibiting the arousal of anger among Black respondents? Further corroboration of this claim comes from examination of Black respondents’ propensities to report other negative emotions. If African Americans are reporting less anger but more sadness or fear relative to Whites, then they would appear not to be resigned in response to their political environment, but rather more fretful or disconsolate. Thus, I ran separate ordered logit regressions for the remaining emotion questions in the CMPS (regression results not shown). Odds ratios of Black respondents expressing each emotion relative to Whites (with all controls set to mean values) are presented in Figure 3 below.

[Figure 3 about here]

As Figure 3 illustrates, Black respondents are not reporting greater rates of fear or sadness over the election relative to White respondents. In fact, African Americans are reporting fear at significantly lower rates than Whites. Black respondents report the remaining emotions at rates no different than their White counterparts. This set of findings indicates that the slight (but statistically distinguishable from zero) inhibition of anger among Blacks is not due to them feeling a greater preponderance of other negative emotions in anger’s stead. Generally, African Americans appear to exhibit a bit of emotional resilience in response to an election environment that was characterized as turning many people “mad as hell.” This finding supports the claim of hypothesis H1. But to truly understand the implications of this anger deficit requires exploring
the effects of anger on the political behavior or Blacks and Whites, respectively. To this question I now turn.2

I ran a series of separate logistic models for Black and White respondents, each with a different form of participation as the dependent variable. The effects of each of the emotions on respondents’ likelihood of taking the respective action are displayed in Tables 2 through 4, below. The tables correspond to the three categorizations of participation—electoral, community and governmental, and discourse and disruptive. The same demographic, resource and engagement variables included as controls in the preceding analyses are also included in the models presented here, although they are not shown in the tables for greater ease of comprehension. Controlling for the standard factors associated with political participation, two trends emerge. One, across the three domains of activity, anger appears to exert stronger mobilizing effects for Whites than Blacks. Two—although less germane to this study—it appears that the positive emotion of pride is more strongly associated with action for Blacks relative to Whites.3

[Table 2 about here]

Turning to the domain of electoral activity, anger does not demonstrate a statistically discernible effect on voting or campaigning for either group. The effect of anger on financial contributions is strong for whites, but only marginally significant for Blacks. Anger is strongly associated with wearing or posting campaign signage for both groups. But the magnitude of the effect for White respondents is notably larger than the magnitude of the effect on Black respondents.

[Table 3 about here]

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2 While I do not address here the question of what distinct factors promote or inhibit reports of anger among Black and White respondents, I have run some analyses exploring my ideas on this, and look forward to presenting those findings at the talk. Specifically, I examine how racial attitudes, indicators of Black group consciousness, the aforementioned group efficacy measures and views on Black Lives Matter (BLM) associate with reporting of anger for Blacks—and when applicable, for Whites.

3 This finding is actually germane to my larger project, and I will elaborate a bit more on it in the presentation.
Racial differences appear to be more pronounced in the domain of community and governmental activities. Among White respondents, anger exhibits a strong association with all three activities. Among Black respondents in contrast, the effect of anger is only distinguishable from zero in the domain of contacting government officials. And the coefficient effect for Black respondents is just over half the size of the coefficient for Whites.

[Table 4 about here]

Finally, on to the realm of discourse and disruptive politics, displayed in Table 4. Bearing in mind the strong senses of group identity and consciousness that animate within Blacks a strong sense of community solidarity, and given the rich history of Black participation in insurgent politics (from slave revolts to Garveyism to non-violent direct action to Black Power movements), one might expect anger reported by Black respondents to have its strongest effects on this domain of activity. And that certainly appears to be the case. Across all four models, reports of anger exhibit a strong and positive association with Black participation. Yet still, in all four models the magnitude of anger’s influence on Black participation pales in comparison with its effect on the participation of White respondents.

To more effectively interpret the racial cleavages in the mobilizing effects of anger on participation, Figure 4 below presents predicted probabilities. The values illustrated represent the increase in respondents’ likelihood of engaging in the listed action when going from reporting feeling no anger at all to feeling angry all the time (with all controls set at their means).

[Figure 4 about here]

The displayed probabilities make resoundingly clear what the logit regression models suggest. Anger is a far greater mobilizer of political action for White respondents than their Black counterparts. Moving from least to most angry increases Whites’ likelihood of having engaged in many of these activities by upwards of twenty and thirty percent. In every case except protest, these increases for Whites far surpass the increases in likelihood for Blacks.

In sum, the findings reveal a statistically significant gap in reports of anger over the election between Black and White respondents. But the deficit in the mobilizing effects of anger
for Blacks and Whites appears to be even more striking. Evidently, the consensus view that anger is an effective mobilizer of action may not apply as readily to African Americans as it does to White Americans. The racialized lens of interpretation Black Americans use to navigate their political environment may inhibit the arousal of anger in response to phenomena that engender anger among their White compatriots. Further, it may dampen the effect of the anger that does materialize on Black individuals’ subsequent political activity.

**(Abbreviated) Discussion and Conclusion**

The findings presented here raise a number of important questions that drive future examinations deriving from this work. Among them, to what extent did the anger deficit uncovered in these analyses play a role in the 2016 election outcome? Can this motivational factor be disentangled from other factors affecting Black turnout in 2016, notably the barrage of laws across the country restricting Black access to the polls? To what extent do these anger deficits extend beyond Blacks to other racial/ethnic groups? Asian American respondents in the CMPS demonstrated the greatest propensity *not* to report feelings of anger. Does that lessened proclivity carry implications for the political behavior of this group? Latinx Americans did not appear to report anger at lower rates than Whites. But would the mobilizing impact of anger on this groups’ behavior be closer to that of White or Black respondents?

What do these findings indicate about the viability of a Democratic Party struggling to appeal to its increasingly diverse base at a time of significant racial polarization? These findings indicate that messages seeking to energize the base behind an anger inducing message may be generally ignored among the Black rank and file, creating a divergence with Whites who are generally rallied by the call. Could the project presented here explain the generally tepid response of Black Democrats (at least those over 30) to the campaign of Bernie Sanders, which was rooted in appeals to indignation over an economic system deemed broken? Can the Democratic Party find a balance between communicating anger appeals that appear to work effectively for Whites and communicating separate appeals to animate the distinct emotions that mobilize Black participation (such as pride)?

The increasing diversification of the electorate means minority participation is more critical than ever in shaping both electoral outcomes and the ensuing policy landscape. Thus, it is imperative to understand how cues in the political environment may be mobilizing action among...
a significantly greater proportion of whites than racial/ethnic minorities, thus exacerbating the racial participation gap and further distancing minority groups from their policy goals. If Black Americans are to be mobilized effectively in the post-Obama era, the solution may lie not in cues intended to make them mad as hell, but rather cues intended to cut through the narrative of black subjugation and engender contentment with the political environment—perhaps a tall order in the Trump era.
References


TABLE 1: Ordinal logistic regression—Influence of race and demographic, resource and engagement factors on reports of anger

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>COEF.</th>
<th>SE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Latino/a</td>
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<td>Afraid</td>
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<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Party ID</td>
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<td>Woman</td>
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<td>Aged 35 and younger</td>
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<td>Interest in Politics</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
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Table 2: Logit Regressions—Influence of emotions on participation in electoral activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EMOTION</th>
<th>VOTE</th>
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<th>SIGNAGE</th>
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<td>WHITES</td>
<td>BLACKS</td>
<td>WHITES</td>
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<td>Angry</td>
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<td>0.51 (0.32)</td>
<td>0.94 (0.66)</td>
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<td>0.23 (0.29)</td>
<td>0.31 (0.55)</td>
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<td>Sad</td>
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<td>0.10 (0.84)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hopeful</td>
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<td>.01 (0.94)</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.31)</td>
<td>0.85 (0.62)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proud</td>
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<td>1.30 (0.98)</td>
<td>1.13*** (0.30)</td>
<td>0.78 (0.60)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations | 1591 | 661 | 2273 | 905 | 2273 | 905 | 2273 | 905 |
Pseudo R2    | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.21 | 0.10 | 0.14 |
### Table 3: Logit Regressions—Influence of emotions on participation in community and governmental activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EMOTION</th>
<th>SOLVE LOCAL PROBLEM</th>
<th>ATTEND LOCAL MEETING</th>
<th>CONTACT GOVT OFFICIAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>WHITES</td>
<td>BLACKS</td>
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<td>(0.39)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations | 1591 | 905 | 2273 | 905 | 2273 | 905 |
Pseudo R2 | 0.07 | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.17 | 0.12 | 0.18 |

### Table 4: Logit Regressions—Influence of emotions on participation in discourse and disruptive activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EMOTION</th>
<th>DISCUSS POLITICS</th>
<th>POLITICS ON SOCIAL MEDIA</th>
<th>PARTICIPATE IN PROTEST</th>
<th>SIGN PETITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BLACKS</td>
<td>WHITES</td>
<td>BLACKS</td>
<td>WHITES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>0.93**</td>
<td>1.82***</td>
<td>0.83***</td>
<td>1.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afraid</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>1.37*</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopeful</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proud</td>
<td>-0.52^</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations | 2273 | 905 | 2273 | 905 | 2273 | 905 |
Pseudo R2 | 0.17 | 0.23 | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.19 | 0.08 | 0.13 |
Figure 1: Distributions of reported anger over election, across race

Never | Sometimes | Often | Always
--- | --- | --- | ---
White | 20 | 30 | 10 | 40
Black | 30 | 30 | 10 | 30
Latinx | 40 | 20 | 10 | 30
Asian | 30 | 30 | 30 | 10
Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities--Likelihood of expressing each category of anger, by race

- Black
- White

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEVER</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMETIMES</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFTEN</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL THE TIME</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3: Odds Ratios—Comparing Black respondents’ likelihood of reporting emotions over 2016 election

Control variables set at their means: emotions toward the election (afraid, sad, hopeful, proud), education attained, party ID, church attendance, gender, age, linked fate, interest in politics, and whether respondent voted.
Control variables set at their means: emotions toward the election (afraid, sad, hopeful, proud), education attained, party ID, church attendance, gender, age, linked fate, interest in politics, and whether respondent voted.